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Abstract
From the Soviet Bloc to the Ballot Box: Democratization in Eastern Europe
Tyler Swafford
Dr. Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Department of Government and Economics
This undergraduate honors thesis examines the common causes of democratic transitions
in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine. One purpose of this honors project is to discern why
certain countries like Poland and Latvia have successfully transitioned to and
consolidated stable democratic institutions, while others like Ukraine have not. One
central question examines the degree of influence that foreign actors exerted in promoting
democracy movements in Eastern Europe. A theoretical framework will be established by
combining parts of the models of Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. The
research project will place special scrutiny on Huntington’s theory of foreign actors
affecting democratic change. This thesis will examine how changes in the approach to
foreign affairs by the Soviet Union, the Vatican, and the U.S. influenced Eastern Europe
during the “third wave” of democratization. More specifically, these changes will be
linked to the rise of civil society in the region, like Solidarity in Poland. Other causes and
aspects of democratic transformation will also be examined, like demographics in Latvia
and the deep-rooted problems of corruption, economic stagnation, and dependence on
Russia that continue to plague the Ukrainian democracy. At the end, implications of the
study will be explored in light of resurgent Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and
around the world. Questions surrounding the Trump administration and the future of
transatlantic security and stability will be addressed.
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Introduction
In order to understand the history and imagine the future of democracy, it is vital
to understand the phenomenon of the “third wave” of democratization in the twentieth
century in a way that illuminates the factors that led to its occurrence. Three fundamental
questions guide the study of this period and of global democratization in general. First, it
is imperative to determine both the independent and common factors that led to the
democratic transformations in the Eastern Bloc. This study will thus seek to discern the
common causes of recent democratic transformations in post-communist Europe by
specifically studying the cases of Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine. Through qualitative and
quantitative means, various hypotheses and causes of modern democratization will be
applied to these three cases thematically to more fully comprehend the dynamics of
democratic transition. By doing so, common causes that initiated democratic opening in
these three countries will be studied.
Second, it is necessary to find out why some countries in this region (such as
Poland and Latvia) were relatively successful in making the transition to democracy and
sustaining its institutions, and why others (like Ukraine) faltered after attempting to
democratize and continue to experience significant problems. These reasons are certainly
complex, and some are interrelated with the causative factors of democratization.
However, this question will yield a closer and more in-depth look at each of the three
countries individually. The mere fact that each country had differing outcomes and
varying degrees of success demonstrates the truth that, whatever forces led to those
results, they largely are specific to that nation. Today, Poland and Latvia are established
members of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
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Union (EU), and are two of the fastest growing European economies. Conversely, the
Ukrainian democracy has been plagued by rigged elections, vast economic stagnation, a
weak judiciary, and widespread government corruption. Clearly distinguishing the
reasons for these contrasting results is not only important, but necessary, to comprehend
the challenges of consolidating a democracy after transition.
Third, the role of geographical proximity and foreign influences must be
scrutinized in relation to a country’s democratic fortunes. This can be understood as the
“Neighbor Effect,” or the “Domino Effect,” as Dr. Samuel Huntington labels it.
Numerous political scientists argue that transitions to any regime are mostly due to
domestic factors that originate from within a country. However, the broader location and
conditions of the international realm should not be discounted when examining
democratization, especially in a region like Eastern Europe. The instruments of influence
and coercion that exist in the arsenal of regional powers and global hegemons enable
these foreign actors to exert power on other countries and their political processes. These
foreign actors vary from specific countries to international organizations.
Inherent in this category of study is pondering the role of the West in supporting
democracy abroad (and in these three cases) as well as the influence that Russia continues
to wield over former Soviet satellite states and nations within their “sphere of influence”
like Ukraine. Influence and power can manifest themselves in economic and diplomatic
sanctions, humanitarian aid, coalition pressure and pressure from international
organizations, as well as other incentives. These tools, along with others, comprise what
is known in the diplomatic community as “soft power.” Coupled with the opposite means
of influence – hard power or the threat of military force - these tactics can be incredibly
2
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impactful in pressuring a country to change its ways. The role of the “Neighbor Effect,”
and the foreign policies of the U.S. and Soviet Union, as well as the influence of
supranational organizations like NATO and the European Community and even other
sources of power like the Vatican, were at the epicenter of the transition to democracy in
the Eastern Bloc. Likewise, these foreign factors were equally as powerful in affecting
the different regime outcomes that existed between each country and continue to exist in
the present-day. Therefore, this angle of evaluating the past and current state of
democracy in eastern Europe must not be undervalued.
Before revealing hypotheses, it is first necessary to explore the background of this
subject, and lay out the theoretical framework through which this study will partially be
conducted. The work of certain scholars will be used to examine cases of
democratization, and will provide various methods for determining the most relevant
causes of transformation for each country. Huntington, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz, and
others all have made substantive contributions to this subject. After laying out the
theoretical framework, hypotheses will be constructed to guide the study going forward.
Then, necessary findings, data, and qualitative analysis will be thoroughly disclosed.
These findings will be amalgamated in the broader international context when possible.
Finally, after summarizing the study in the conclusion, implications of each transition
will be explored in order to imagine the future the region. In doing so, present-day
geopolitical realities will be considered.
Background
One hundred years ago to this month, on April 2, 1917, the president of the
United States had had enough. After years of unilateral aggression by an authoritarian
3
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regime in the German empire and dogged American neutrality, President Woodrow
Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress, asking for war. Yet, the motive of his plea
did not solely pertain to the interests of his own country. Rather, he believed the destiny
of the world order was at stake. That world order, the international community that
Wilson envisioned, was to be grounded in one thing: democracy. He believed the U.S.
had a responsibility to intervene in the European conflict, the “War to End All Wars,” to,
in his words: “make the world safe for democracy” (Wilson). With this statement,
President Wilson not only marked the beginning of a new era in American foreign policy
thought, but he also advocated for a new international order.
Although this was a bold new idea, the foundation of Wilson’s idea for the
future of the international system had existed for centuries. Democracy is a form of
government that dates back to ancient Greece. Although present in the works of
philosophers like Aristotle and Plato, the modern propagation of democracy did not
emerge until the latter part of the 18th century (Huntington, 5-6). At that point in history,
democratic revolutions in America and France shocked the western world and
demonstrated the rising prominence of this new governing model and idea. It took the
French a few decades to consolidate their democracy and make the full transition, but the
U.S. and France both quickly became dominant players on the world stage. Nevertheless,
the spread of democracy was slow. In the ensuing 160 years, only a few states undertook
democratic transitions - like Switzerland and Great Britain in the 19th century. In the
immediate aftermath of the second World War, Italy, Austria, Japan, Korea, and West
Germany accepted various democratic institutions initiated by the Allied occupiers
(Huntington, 16-19). Turkey and Greece crept toward democracy around the same time,

4

Swafford 5
as did many Latin American countries (Huntington, 19). Democracy did not begin to
significantly spread, however, until the twilight of the Cold War. Specifically, the
military coup in Portugal in 1974 marked the beginning of what Samuel P. Huntington
famously labeled the “third wave,” and most dominant period, of global democratic
transition (Huntington, 4). This broadly refers to the period between 1974 and 1991, but
especially between 1989 and 1991, wherein approximately thirty countries from around
the world made the transition from nondemocratic to democratic regimes. This
constituted the most important movement of the late twentieth century. It prompted
political scientists and international relations scholars like Francis Fukuyama to
hypothesize the “end of history,” when democracy would ultimately prove to be the
universal, predominant, and final form of government. Fukuyama’s exact words from the
controversial 1989 essay were: “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of
the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of
history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government ”
(Roth & Fukuyama). Long ago were the days of the surging totalitarianism that led to
World War II. This new “wave” of democratic transition was a consequential event,
giving many Western scholars and proponents of freedom much cause for optimism.
Although the movement toward democracy in this period spanned geographic
regions, the area in which it was most concentrated was east-central Europe. After World
War II, the Soviet Empire bolstered their regional hegemony, spreading their influence in
most of Eastern Europe. Joseph Stalin and the Soviet regime moved quickly after the
Allied victory to effectively colonize their western neighbors. After the grueling military
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campaign that ended in pushing the Nazi’s back to Berlin, the Soviets empowered
Moscow loyalists within each of their occupied territories to assume political power.
They infiltrated police forces in countries like Poland and won the propaganda war by
dominating radio waves in the region (Applebaum). The Soviets also used these occupied
states for mercantile purposes. They uprooted factories, industries, and even material
goods, to bring back to the U.S.S.R. to assuage the starvation and economic woes that
spread across the country during the war (Applebaum). The most notable manifestation
of Soviet intervention in eastern Europe was the installment of numerous puppet
communist regimes. Authoritarian governments in Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were, in effect, created and
propped up by Soviet Russia. The “sphere of influence” that Stalin envisioned when
discussing Europe’s partition with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany in the MolotovRibbentrop non-aggression pact of 1939 had taken hold in a most pronounced manner
(“A secret protocol”). The Soviet Union now dominated half of the continent. Marxist
teachings of the 19th century, which centered around a revolution by the “bourgeoisie,”
the political alignment of the working class to communism, and the inevitable domination
of socialist economics, suddenly appeared to be gaining momentum.
The occurrences at the end of the 1980’s represented a stark reversal of Marx’s
projections. For myriad and complicated reasons, both domestic and international, the
world’s preeminent communist state weakened and fell. The Berlin Wall, which divided
up East and West Germany, came down in 1989. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-led
military alliance that existed to counter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

6

Swafford 7
dissolved in the summer of 1991. Then, finally, the U.S.S.R. communist regime fell just
after Christmas of the same year. The Cold War was officially over.
Yet, amid this historic unraveling of a world superpower and its ideology, an
equally important movement was developing in the Soviet bloc of eastern and central
Europe. Fourteen countries quickly declared independence from the Soviet Union, and
pro-democracy movements gained momentum in Poland, Hungary, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania (Huntington). Remarkably,
the political landscape of the former Eastern Bloc was upended almost overnight.
Between 1989 and 1991, every nation in eastern and central Europe held competitive
parliamentary elections for the first time in decades. Although these elections were not all
entirely democratic, and some were only partly free, the rapidity and widespread nature
of this regional political change was shocking and seemingly improbable. In the
“backyard” of the Soviet Union - one of the two foremost global powers - regime types
more resembling that of its hegemonic adversary, the United States, expanded at an
alarming rate. This enabled America to triumph in the all-inclusive confrontation that was
the Cold War and therefore assume lone ownership of the title: “world superpower.”
Authoritarianism was in decline, communism was discredited, and democracy was rising.
Theory
Since the late twentieth century, a number of theories have been devised to
explain this period. Distinct theories have been comprised to evaluate both the
transitional period to democracy and the consolidation phase in which a nation attempts
to cement democratic institutions. Before assessing the causes for transition and reasons
for varied degrees of success in consolidation, qualitative and quantitative methodologies
7
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must be outlined. For the purposes of the transitional period, Samuel P. Huntington’s
theoretical framework outlined in his landmark book: The Third Wave: Democratization
in the Late Twentieth Century provides a strong basis for examining the movement
toward democracy in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine. His theory relies on five overarching
causative factors that are applicable to most cases.
First, Huntington cites the declining legitimacy of authoritarian regimes as an
important cause for democratization. Another term he used for this category was the term
“performance dilemma” (Huntington, 46). For the “third wave” period, this causative
factor can be interpreted as not only the declining legitimacy of authoritarianism, but of
communism specifically. The “performance” aspect of this theory simply refers to the
ability of the state to “deliver the goods,” or foster economic well-being. In Huntington’s
words, “Over time … communist governments found it more difficult to invoke
communist ideology to support their legitimacy. The appeal of the ideology declined as
the state bureaucracy stagnated and socioeconomic inequalities ossified” (Huntington,
48). Furthermore, the economic performance of communist regimes in Eastern Europe measured by commonly used categories like unemployment rates, life expectancy rates,
standards of living, economic growth, and median income levels – created a situation in
1989 in which “Marxism-Leninism made it impossible to develop legitimacy based on
their economic performance” (Huntington, 48). As Huntington notes, popular support for
any regime or government tends to erode over time (Huntington, 48). Yet, in an
authoritarian regime, once support begins to erode and the economy begins to decline,
there is no institutional outlet for political resuscitation. In democracies, there is. New
coalitions and parties rise to power frequently in democratic regimes through a free and
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fair electoral process. Thus, as eastern Europeans developed frustrations with their
governments, they slowly developed desires and expectations for regular, competitive
elections. Additionally, communist regimes lose legitimacy with military failures.
Huntington cites the lengthy and costly war in Afghanistan as a significant reason for the
falling popularity of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s (Huntington, 54).
Second, Huntington lists economic development as a causative factor for
democratization; specifically, the growth of global economic output as a means of
modernizing developing economies. Huntington writes that “economic development, in
short, provide(s) the basis for democracy” (Huntington, 59). Economic crises also play a
part. Huntington refers to oil price hikes in some eastern European countries and MarxistLeninist constraints in other nations that created economic downturns which weakened
authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 59). In essence, Huntington (along with most modern
economists) argues that economic growth and development is interrelated to rising trends
of urbanization, education, and an expanded middle class (Huntington, 66). These
economic trends often create social forces and a civil society that possesses the capacity
to resist authoritarianism and ignite democratic uprisings.
Another cause that Huntington cites for democratization in the “third wave” is
religious changes. This category may not be as universally applicable to East-Central
Europe as political, economic, and external forces. However, its prevalence and influence
is still notable, especially in Poland. Western Christianity is strongly and commonly
associated with democracy, and Huntington notes that, while this correlation does not
prove causation, “Western Christianity emphasizes … the dignity of the individual and
the separate spheres of church and state” (Huntington, 73). After all, modern democracies
9
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first appeared almost exclusively in Christian countries. As Huntington points out, at the
time of Third Wave, 57% of predominantly Western Christian countries were democratic,
while only 12% of non-Christian nations were democracies (Huntington, 73). Therefore,
it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the expansion of Christianity promotes
democratic development. The ascension of Pope John Paul II to the head of the Catholic
Church and the doctrinal changes dictated in Vatican II are vital to examine as it relates
to the Polish democratic transition.
The fourth factor, external forces; the and the fifth hypothesized cause, the
“Regional Contingency Factor,” or the “Domino theory,” allow for an evaluation of the
“third wave” with an international scope. Various international factors were instrumental
in the fates of regimes in Eastern Europe and around the world. The burgeoning question
that must be addressed, however, is how significant these foreign influences were. There
is much debate about this in the intellectual community, and of course it is difficult to
quantify. Yet, understanding the role of global powers in the “third wave” period of
democratization, as well as how they affected – and continue to affect - the consolidation
of democracy in the present-day, is essential.
The second central question that underpins the study of democratization in these
three cases – the reasons for varied degrees of success in consolidating and sustaining a
democracy – can be answered using a combination of theories and data. It is necessary to
examine this category through both a qualitative and quantitative lens, because the areas
that illuminate the differing levels of success in a democracy manifest themselves in
easily comparable numbers and explanatory theories. Among others, the studies of
German political scientist Wolfgang Merkel are relevant to measuring success in
10
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consolidation. Merkel’s theories of “embedded democracy” and “partial regimes” can be
used to understand how Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine all had varying outcomes after their
respective transitions. Merkel’s concept of “embedded democracy” rests on the claim that
in order for a democratic electoral system to function properly (when competitive
elections produce winners that accurately reflect popular preferences and who assume
power peacefully), then certain behavioral, institutional, and structural elements – called
“partial regimes” – must be in place (Erisen and Kubicek, 5). Merkel’s four partial
regimes consist of political participation, civil liberties, mutual constraints on the
executive and horizontal accountability, and the effective power to govern (Erisen and
Kubicek, 13). Through examining “micro” and “macro” levels of governance, Merkel’s
model will allow for the assessment of a broad range of variables in evaluating the
democratic outcomes in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine after transition. His framework
provides a theoretically informed means of gauging how an issue within a particular
partial regime can yield a larger fault line that exists throughout the entire system. (Erisen
and Kubicek, 4).
Additionally, the “consolidation” question will be addressed using data from
relevant databases like the Freedom House Index, Polity Score, Human Development
Index, and Gini coefficient. These indexes provide in-depth information regarding
political, economic, and humanitarian statuses within countries that are necessary to
compare in the both period of democratic transition and the present-day. Comparing this
data between each of the three Eastern European countries, and examining their changing
scores in each category, will provide a clear illustration of the causes that surrounded
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liberalization. Moreover, it will enable one to understand why there have been varied
degrees of success in consolidation post-1991.
The work of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan in the area of democratic consolidation
is notable as well, and entirely relevant to apply to this second question. Their definitions
of how a consolidated democracy operates behaviorally, attitudinally, and
constitutionally form a benchmark from which the modern states of the Polish, Latvian,
and Ukrainian systems can be judged (Linz and Stepan, 6). The most pertinent theoretical
contribution of Linz and Stepan is their “five arenas of a consolidated democracy.” In this
framework, they outline certain pre-requisites and necessary conditions for the
sustenance of a democratic regime. First is civil society. This aspect of democratic
consolidation pervaded most countries during the “third wave,” and these authors
acknowledged that civil society was “crucial in Eastern Europe as a vehicle for asserting
the autonomy of those who wanted to act ‘as if they were free,’” (Linz and Stepan, 7).
The second arena is political society: the development of the “core institutions … by
which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government”
(Linz and Stepan, 8).
Third, the rule of law is a commonly accepted trait that must characterize a
consolidated democracy. As Linz an Stepan note, a state’s claim over the monopoly of
the legitimate use of force in order to protect citizens and deliver services is required for
any sustainable democracy (10,11). The aforementioned three “arenas” of consolidation
outlined by Linz and Stepan are also “pre-requisites” to consolidation. Fourth, there must
be an effective state bureaucracy to institutionalize democratic procedures. This depends
on the ability of a state to command, regulate, and extract resources; and provide basic
12
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entitlements in its territory amongst its people (Linz and Stepan, 11). Lastly, Linz and
Stepan claim that “economic society,” or the “set of socio-politically crafted and accepted
norms, institutions, and regulations…that mediates between state and market,” is another
supportive condition for a consolidated democracy. (Linz and Stepan, 11). The ability of
a state to periodically intervene in areas of the market and perform certain functions is
foundational, even when privatization is the goal. A strong state that has the capacity to
enact some degree of state regulation is important for a democratic system to consolidate
and operate in the long term. Linz and Stepan’s framework can be used to examine
causative factors evident in both the transitional phase and the consolidation phase,
because oftentimes some of the same causes that ignite a transition can remain relevant in
consolidation.
Hypotheses
Due to the many theories dedicated to this period of resurgent democracy, there
are a number of opinions regarding the true reasons for the “third wave.” Certainly, this is
not a black and white area of study. The transitions that began in the late 1980’s
emanated out of a complicated geopolitical landscape. The causes for each transition
were complex and multifaceted. Those many causes are not what divides scholars; the
vast majority of the reasons cited by the intellectual community did in fact exist to some
degree in Eastern Europe and are not in dispute. The area of ambiguity lies with the
degree of influence that these causes exerted. Much less consensus is found among
scholars regarding this issue. Some causes – such as civil society, Soviet reforms, and
changes in demographics, are widely agreed to be of considerable importance. Yet, the
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relative impact of other causes – like religion and the influence of foreign actors – are
debated.
In light of the research at hand and the implications of this time period, the
aforementioned causes of democratization will be further examined and affirmed. First,
certain civilian organizations and forms of peaceful resistance – known as “civil society”
in the political science field – will be found to be heavily influential, especially in the
case of Poland. Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy reforms, which angered many hardline
factions in the Soviet communist apparatus and precipitated the fall of the U.S.S.R., were
common causes of each transition in Europe. Demographic changes were especially
important in Latvia. Not only were changes in the population of ethnic Russians and their
attitudes pertinent to the political transitions in the Baltic states, but implications of these
changes remained equally as impactful during the consolidation phase as well. The state
of demographics in Latvia and other Baltic states still undergird questions about the
future of this region today, especially in light of the recent Russian military intervention
in Ukraine.
In addition to asserting the importance of the previously cited causes, this study
argues that other causes are of equal, if not more, importance to the cases of Poland,
Latvia, and Ukraine and post-communist Eastern Europe at large. With regard to Poland,
the role that religion and the Catholic Church played in liberalizing the country and
pushing back against Soviet authoritarianism must not be understated. Analysis will show
that the Church, and the values it effectively spread, helped inspire the Solidarity
movement and lay the groundwork for not only the Polish transition, but the whole
region’s triumph over communism. The role of geographic proximity and the influence of
14
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foreign actors will also be shown to be of colossal importance. Foreign factors are
sometimes undervalued by scholars, as many tend to focus mainly on the domestic
conditions of any political transition. But the “Neighbor Effect” and the varying forms of
power wielded by international hegemons and organizations must not be diminished. This
cause should occupy as much scrutiny as domestic causes do. After all, most domestic
causes are interrelated to global or regional dynamics.
It is important that each country case be examined not with a microscope, but
with mindfulness of the international environment and the forces therein. If that is done,
then the linkage between seemingly individual causes, like civil society, demographics,
and economics, will be connected to broader global movements. This study hypothesizes
that the de-legitimization of communism in Eastern Europe – triggered by Soviet reforms
and amplified by the rising influence of the Vatican and United States - emboldened
dissent and gave way to civil society movements which effectively stood up to
authoritarians and brought democratic change to the Eastern Bloc. It will also assess
current geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe in light of resurgent Russian aggression to
comment on the future stability of democracy in the region.
Country Background
Poland was the first country to transition to a democracy in Eastern Europe. A
satellite state of the U.S.S.R., Poland had formerly been one of the foremost European
powers prior to becoming “stateless” from 1795-1918 due to conquest and partition (Linz
and Stepan, 258). After World War I, Poland was granted independence following the
Treaty of Versailles. Yet, in 1939, a Nazi-Soviet agreement - the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact - agreeing to divide up Northern and Eastern Europe left the country once again
15
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formally dissolved (Kissinger, 272). After World War II, in which Poland was a member
of the victorious Allied coalition, Polish resistance forces launched an uprising against
their Soviet occupiers. It was not until this civil war was quelled that the Soviet Union
established total military dominance over Poland, and the Polish army began to submit to
the Soviet model (Bielasiak, 271).
Latvia, along with her Baltic neighbors Estonia and Lithuania, was independent
from 1918 to 1940 (Linz and Stepan, 403). There were competitive parliamentary
elections held in the 1920’s following the expulsion of Soviet troops and recognition of
Latvian sovereignty, and lands began to be redistributed from wealthy German nobles to
Latvian farmers. However, just as the country was beginning to recover from the damage
of the Great Depression, a coup d’etat ushered in the Ulmanis dictatorship in the mid1930’s (Linz and Stepan, 403). Parliament was suspended, as were political parties and
the Constitution. After six years of dictatorship and a centralized economy, Latvia once
again fell victim to Soviet expansion. The same treaty that preceded the joint invasion of
Poland, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, laid the foundation for the Soviet invasion
and annexation of Latvia (Linz and Stepan, 403). Although the Nazis occupied the
country from 1941 until 1944, the USSR annexed Latvia again after the Allied victory in
Europe. Nevertheless, as Linz and Stepan note, “Latvia had the most substantial prior
experience of democratic politics of any of the Soviet republics” (402-403). Constructive
as that reality may have been, it was still a long road back to democracy.
Ukraine, conversely, had virtually no democratic history. Divided between Tsarist
Russia and Hapsburg Austria prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Ukraine became the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) following a bloody war with the
16
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Red Army in 1922. The Ukrainian SSR became one of the founding members of the
Soviet Union, and, later, the United Nations (UN-DPI). In the 1930’s, the USSR cracked
down on Ukrainian cultural autonomy, installing policies of russification that transformed
Ukraine’s demographics and led to a massive famine, the “Holomodor” (Famine of
1932). Nikita Khrushchev was named head of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938,
which he led before taking the same position for the entirety of the USSR following
Stalin’s death in 1953. Like Latvia, Ukraine was occupied by Nazis during World War II.
Only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 did Ukraine become independent,
making the transition to a market economy. Yet, due to a number of reasons, many to do
with continued Russian interference and economic fluctuations, Ukraine has struggled to
consolidate a democratic regime, suppress corruption, and keep control of its territory.
Findings
It is impossible to observe the regime changes in the third wave without noting
the strong presence and influence of civil society. In all three country cases, at various
times, grassroots protest movements emerged to form a popular means of resistance
against the regime. One of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s five pre-conditions for a
consolidated democracy, civil society also helped initiate transitions in post-communist
Eastern Europe, especially in Poland. As Linz and Stepan define it: “civil society…(is)
that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals,
relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and
solidarities, and advance their interests” (7). The fact that none of the resistance
movements in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine were terminally suppressed, such as peaceful
pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square were around the same time, demonstrates
17
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that the regimes lacked the popular support and legitimacy to go against the will of the
people.
Civil society and the Catholic Church
In Poland, civil society manifested itself in two forms: the Catholic Church and
“Solidarity”. With its staunch commitment to atheism, the communist apparatus in
Eastern Europe tried to stamp out any form of religion in the populace. The Roman
Catholic Church, however, became a central organization through which people in
Poland could make their voices heard. This represented a contrast to the Orthodox
Christian Church, which historically represented the national religion and was
intertwined with the voice of the state (Huntington, 73-76). Roman Catholicism,
however, became a transnational organization that gave voice to dissidents and opponents
of repressive regimes (Huntington, 82). The Church was a refuge for people who wanted
to articulate certain moral beliefs and organize as one to advance their religious values.
The communist regimes in Poland and elsewhere pushed secularism on a grand scale, and
sought to undermine the Church at every turn (Linz and Stepan, 245). They intentionally
attempted to persecute religious groups, infiltrate churches, and ban clergy from positions
of high status (Linz and Stepan, 245). Yet, in Poland, there was a strong religious culture.
According to a study conducted by Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer at the time of
the Polish democratic transition, 84% of Poles were churchgoers (Rose and Haerpfer).
Huntington noted that in the 1950’s, the authoritarian structure of the Catholic
Church made it a barrier to democratization (77). Changes made in the Church’s doctrine,
however, turned it into a force for democracy after 1970. The most notable change was
undoubtedly the convening of the Second Vatican Council, or Vatican II, commissioned
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by Pope John XXIII in the 1960’s. Held to address relations between the Catholic Church
and the modern world, Vatican II stressed the importance of social change and political
accountability (Huntington, 78). Moreover, a recurring theme was the dignity of
individual rights. One passage discussing the role of the Church asserted that its leaders
have the onus to “pass moral judgements, even on matters of political order whenever
basic personal rights make such judgment necessary” (Smith, 284). These doctrinal
changes outlined the new role of church in society, and prompted many of its leaders and
followers to oppose communist regimes according their religious values.
The ascension of Cardinal Wojtyla, originally from a small town close to Krakow,
to the pinnacle of the Catholic Church, changed everything. Pope John Paul II became a
central figure in the Church’s role as a vessel of resistance to authoritarianism. As
Huntington wrote when discussing the importance of Pope John Paul II to the “third
wave” of democracy, immediately upon rising to the papacy, he “denounced violations of
human rights and explicitly identified the Church as the ‘guardian’ of freedom ‘which is
the condition and basis for the human person’s true dignity’” (Huntington, 83). Human
rights lay at the center of the Church’s resistance oppressive communist regimes under
his leadership. The Pope himself asserted the commonalities between his mission and
democratization while speaking out against Pinochet’s regime in Chile in 1987: “I am not
the evangelizer of democracy; I am the evangelizer of the Gospel. To the Gospel
message, of course, belong all the problems of human rights; and if democracy means
human rights, then it also belongs to the message of the Church.” (Huntington, 84). Pope
John Paul II always seemed to be in the right country at the right time - during the middle
of its struggle towards democracy. Being the first non-Italian pope in over four and a half

19

Swafford 20
centuries, and a Polish national who played soccer with Jews and fled the Nazi’s in his
youth, he had lived out the perils of extreme political power (Stourton, 32). As Pope
during a consequential time in which the world order was shifting, his pastoral visits had
profound political effects – both in Europe and South America (Huntington, 83). None
was more powerful than the first visit to his home country.
In 1979, shortly after assuming the papacy, Pope John Paul II visited Poland. This
was his homecoming visit, and massive crowds lined the streets to hear his words and
cheer (BBC, 1992). This epic first visit undoubtedly lifted the spirits of the beleaguered
nation, and planted the seeds for civic and democratic renewal. One Polish bishop
observed: “(his first visit) altered the mentality of fear…people learned that if they ceased
to fear the system, then the system was helpless.” (Huntington, 83). British historian
Timothy Garton Ash remarked that this “first great pilgrimage…was the beginning of the
end of communism in Eastern Europe. Here, for the first time, we saw that largescale…supremely peaceful and self-disciplined manifestation of social unity, the gentle
crowd against the Party-state, which was both the hallmark and the essential domestic
catalyst of change in 1989” (Ash, 1990, 17). Ash went on to cite the remarks of Lech
Walesa, his chief political opponent General Wojciech Jaruzelski, President George
Bush, and Russian President Gorbachev. Each of these world leaders contributed the fall
of the Iron Curtain in part to the Pope, leading Ash to conclude: “without the Polish Pope,
no Solidarity revolution in Poland in 1980; without Solidarity, no dramatic change in
Soviet policy towards eastern Europe under Gorbachev; without that change, no velvet
revolutions in 1989” (Ash, 2005).
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Others also connect the Pope’s effective leadership not only to a revitalization in
civil society and the role of the Church in society, but to the rise of “Solidarity” and the
fall of communism itself. One of the preeminent historians of the Cold War, John Lewis
Gaddis, said that the Pope’s initial trip inspired the formation of “Solidarity” and initiated
communism’s downfall: “when Pope John Paul II kissed the ground at the Warsaw
airport he began the process by which Communism in Poland – and ultimately elsewhere
in Europe – would come to an end” (Gaddis, 193). Indeed, the call of Pope John Paul II
to abandon fear, pursue freedom, and seek only the goodness and affirmation that comes
from God inspired a nation, revived a region, and mobilized millions. Imploring the
citizenry to change their own regimes from within rather than inciting violence, the Pope
watched as his homeland conquered communism and chose democracy just ten years
later.
After the passionate appeal of the new pontifex and a combination of other
sociopolitical changes, civil movements spread with great rapidity across Eastern Europe.
The most famous, of course, was Solidarity. Founded in 1980 by Lech Walesa, Solidarity
was the first labor union in a Warsaw Pact country not controlled by a communist party
(Linz and Stepan, 262). It membership quickly rose to over 10 million, which
encompassed about one-third of the working age population in Poland (Linz and Stepan,
262). Solidarity was a social platform that pushed for Polish worker’s rights, among other
societal changes. It was popular, effective, and supported by the Vatican and the U.S., in
the form of 50 million dollars (Judt, 589). The CIA under the Reagan administration
provided covert support to Solidarity in the form of money, newspapers and propaganda,
and organizational advice (Sussman, 128). Their strikes and public demonstrations, and

21

Swafford 22
the widespread support of the citizenry it galvanized, made Solidarity a problem for the
communist regime. Martial law was enacted early in the 1980’s, along with other means
of suppression, but eventually the regime was forced to the negotiating table with the
popular union (Linz and Stepan, 264).
The success of Solidarity was a historic first for the entire Eastern Bloc. Gone
were the days when the Polish United Worker’s Party (the communist regime), put down
protests with deadly machine-guns. Gone, too, were the days when full-scale Soviet-led
invasions brutally extinguished popular movements in other countries, like the Hungarian
Uprising in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968 (Linz and Stepan, 237-238). Although
Solidarity’s peaceful means of civil resistance was initially met with martial law and
imprisonment, both sides ended up compromising. The Round Table talks were held at
the end of the 1980’s. Here, the Polish government and Solidarity agreed to conduct
elections in 1989 – the first (semi) free elections of any country in the communist Eastern
Bloc. This marked the beginning of the 1989 anti-communist democratic revolutions all
across East-Central Europe. Poland was the first, and Solidarity was the engine from
within that made it happen.
Although Solidarity was the most notable case of civil society during this time
period, Poland was not the only country that witnessed popular social movements bring
about democracy. The “Singing Revolution” in Latvia, as well as the “Orange
Revolution” in Ukraine, are two other examples. In Latvia, rumors that the Soviet Union
would build another hydroelectric power plant along its longest river, as well as a metro
in Riga, further threatened the cultural and environmental landscape of the country.
Following Gorbachev’s reforms in Moscow which condoned wider economic
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liberalization in the Soviet satellites, a number of Latvian groups rose up to call for
independence. The Latvian People’s Front, the Latvian National Independence
Movement, and the Citizens’ Congress all demanded the restoration of Latvian
sovereignty and held public demonstrations in the fall of 1988. Approximately one year
later, a massive “human chain” was formed across all three Baltic countries on the fiftieth
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The People’s Fronts of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania organized an extraordinary demonstration of Baltic unity by forming a 420
mile-long “Baltic chain of freedom” that ran through the capitals of each country and was
comprised of over 2 million people (Dreifelds, 34). This was a symbolic call for unity
and independence from the Soviet Union. Less than seven months later, new elections to
the “Supreme Soviet” (the legislative bodies) were held. In May, after continued social
resistance and Soviet decline, Latvia finally declared its independence in 1991.
The Orange Revolution restored hope in Ukrainian democracy in 2004. The runoff vote for the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was tainted by corruption and voter
fraud. Results were thought to be rigged by government authorities in favor of Viktor
Yanukovych over his opponent, Viktor Yushchenko (Aslund and McFaul). Kiev became
the rallying point for pro-democracy protests and acts of civil disobedience, strikes, and
sit-ins. In November, over half a million people convened at Kiev’s Independence Square
wearing orange, the color of Yushchenko’s campaign, and marched peacefully around
Verkhovna Rada, the parliament building (Karatnycky). The democratic revolution led to
the Supreme Court’s announcement that the election results would be nullified, and a
second run-off was freely and fairly conducted. This resulted in a clear victory for the
challenger, Yushchenko, and he was sworn in as president in 2005. Ukraine’s democracy
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has ebbed and flowed since then, and still struggles with entrenched problems of
corruption that were not adequately addressed by the Orange movement (Fukuyama,
547). Yet, the Orange Revolution shows that Ukrainians have the capacity to demand
democracy in a peaceful and convincing manner. This movement, as well as the powerful
forms of social uprisings in Latvia and Poland before their respective democratic
transitions, demonstrate the accuracy of Linz and Stepan’s theory that an active civil
society – which is autonomous from the state - is one of the absolute necessary conditions
for democracy. Without the coordinated organization of a populace that is persistent in
petitioning oppressive regimes and demanding political change, authoritarianism will
linger. Today, Poland and Latvia are both free and prosperous largely due to the efforts of
civil society.
Demographics in Latvia
In addition to the popular protest movements like the “Baltic Chain of Freedom,”
Latvia also benefited from the surprising ability of its Russian minority population to
integrate into Latvian society. The issue of the ethnic Russian minority population was at
the heart of their transition to democracy in 1991, and remained a barrier to democratic
consolidation going forward. Latvia had, and still has, the largest population of Russians
among any of the three Baltic states (over one-third of the population at the time of
transition), and, therefore, their ability to assimilate was an important determinant of
whether Latvia could make a smooth transition (Linz and Stepan, 410-412). Furthermore,
democratic consolidation will continue to be most difficult in Latvia, because it is the
most demographically diverse of any Baltic state (Linz and Stepan, 405). As data shows,
Russian minorities felt a strong identification with Latvia and a relatively weak
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identification with the U.S.S.R. during the “third wave” period (Linz and Stepan, 410).
Over half of Russian speakers in Latvia more closely identified with the Latvian state in
1992, which was up 20% from just two years earlier (Linz and Stepan, 411). Moreover,
according to a survey conducted at the time, approximately 85% of non-Latvians felt
“proud” or “very proud” of being a resident of Latvia in 1990 (Klingemann and Titma).
As Linz and Stepan put it, this demonstrated the ability of the Russian minority in Latvia
to have “multiple and complementary identities” and assimilate culturally and politically
(Linz and Stepan, 410). The perceived acceptance of this ethnic “other” by the Latvian
Popular Front and other nationalist factions aided their quest for democracy. The whole
population – comprised of ethnic Balts and ethnic Russians – largely joined together in
protesting communist occupation and united under the cause of independence. As Soviet
influence fell, Balts and Russians grew stronger in their support of democracy, and in
1991, it came to be.
Yet, upon finally making the transition to a democracy, the Latvian government
undertook measures to exclude ethnic Russians from certain freedoms (Linz and Stepan,
409). The newly minted Latvian Popular Front regime restricted citizenship and voting
rights only to pre-1940 citizens and their descendants, thus depriving hundreds of
thousands of Latvian-born Russian speakers these fundamental rights (Linz and Stepan,
414-424). The government also adopted native language policies (Linz and Stepan, 413).
This stark reversal in tone and policy by the new regime towards its Russian minority,
which was mimicked in neighboring Estonia, hampered the quality of Latvian democracy
in the years following independence. These politics of subtraction damaged the
credibility of the Latvian democratic system, and hurt the relations of ethnic Balts with
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Russian minorities (Linz and Stepan, 420). Progress has been made since the mid-1990’s,
and today over half of the Russian minority have gained citizenship. However, many still
retain alien status. Although the Latvian government and economy have developed well
in recent decades, the future health of their democratic system will in part depend on their
ability to be inclusive.
Problems with consolidation
Although Poland is often lauded as the shining success story of democratization in
the Eastern Bloc, its transition did not come without complications. After the Round
Table Talks were held at the end of the 1980’s, in which both sides (Solidarity and the
communist regime) agreed to conduct elections in 1989, Solidarity dominated in the new
political system (Huntington, 23). The labor union-turned-political party won 99 out of
the 100 seats in the newly formed Senate, and 161 of the open seats in the lower house,
the Sejm (Linz and Stepan, 267-269). Lech Walesa himself won the presidency in 1990
and served as president for 5 years (Huntington, 23-24; Steger, 114). However, since
Poland was the first country in the region to democratize, there were faults in the
negotiating process that led to what Linz and Stepan call a “pacted transition” (Linz and
Stepan, 264). Solidarity made certain concessions that hampered the movement towards a
full-blown democracy. For example, 65% of the Sejm would continue to be appointed in
non-competitive elections, and thus a non-democratic house of Parliament was deeply
involved in drafting the new democratic Constitution (Linz and Stepan, 267). The first
president, who under the new Constitution was awarded special powers in national
security, defense, and international affairs (along with emergency powers), was (for the
first year) the old communist head of state, the authoritarian General Wojciech Jaruzelski
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(Linz and Stepan, 268). These reserved remnants of power made it more difficult for
Solidarity to fully accelerate the process of democratization. As is seen so often in
numerous cases of democratic transition around the world, mistakes that allow remnants
of the old autocracy to retain a “seat at the table” in the new government can have
lingering consequences.
While Poland, Latvia, and other Eastern Bloc countries certainly experienced
growing pains in the primitive years of their new democratic regimes, it is still important
to recognize that these transitions, when examined in whole, were largely successful.
Today, Poland and Latvia are thriving countries with relatively strong liberal
democracies. Poland is one of the safest and most visited countries in the world, and
maintains a “very high” score in the Human Development Index, ranking among the top
in the Western world (Linz and Stepan, 269). Latvia, in addition to Poland, is one of
Europe’s fastest growing economies. Both nations are well-established members of both
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), joining in
the early 2000’s. Conversely, Ukraine continues to suffer from economic stagnation,
corruption, and dependence on Russia. Unlike successful Western democracies elsewhere
in central Europe, Ukraine is a prime example of a country that has not consolidated
democratic institutions successfully post-transition.
Ukraine
Ukraine, like all other satellite states, finally claimed independence after the fall
of the Soviet Union, but due to deep-rooted problems that continue to undermine the
country’s sovereignty, its democratic transition continues to be a work in progress at best.
Economic crisis and stagnation has struck the Ukrainian state multiple times after its
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transition. The first crisis occurred immediately after the shift toward a market economy
in 1991, which ignited an eight-year recession (“Macroeconomic indicators”). After a
period of rapid growth in the early-2000’s, the economy shrank 15% in 2009, with 16%
inflation. GDP fell a staggering 20% from spring 2008 to spring 2009 (Inozmi).
Additionally, after the Russian invasion in 2014, annexation of Crimea, and resulting war
in the East, the economy was reduced to zero GDP growth (“Amid staggering
destruction”). Ukraine’s economy is only now beginning to recover from that recent
catastrophe.
A multitude of Ukraine’s economic problems are interrelated to government
corruption and Russian military and economic dominance over the state. Corruption is
the single largest hindrance to democratic consolidation in Ukraine. It costs the state
budget billions annually, Ernst and Young once ranked Ukraine among the three most
corrupt nations in the world back in 2012, and Western diplomats have referred to the
regime as a kleptocracy (Kyiv Post). The executive branch is overreaching and nontransparent - reaping the rewards of clientelism. Ukrainians also have a weak civil society
footprint. The justice system is especially compromised, and represents a complete
failure in democratic integrity. Only about 10% of the population trusts the judicial
system, and judges are vulnerable to pressure from political and business interests as
bribes oftentimes exceed their salaries (Hanouz and Geiger).
Ukraine’s proximity to and dependence on the Russian Federation continues to
stall democratic consolidation in the country. About 40% of Ukraine’s total energy
consumption is dependent on imports from Russian producer Gazprom, who claims that
Ukraine owes billions in debt (Chorvath). With no real short-term energy solutions
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outside of Russian imports, Ukrainian economic sovereignty looks bleak for the future.
Russian is able to leverage its economic superiority over Ukraine to exert its military and
geopolitical might – as witnessed by the Crimea annexation in 2014. In 2013, thenPresident Viktor Yanukovych, who was the initial beneficiary of voter fraud in the 2004
election, mysteriously suspended the installment of an association agreement with the
EU. This led to mass protests by the so-called “Euromaidan” supporters, who eventually
succeeded in ousting Yanukovych (Balmforth). He then fled to Russia in exile, where he
remains today. These events gave way to the invasion in 2014 and ensuing conflict in the
eastern region of Donbas, where Yanukovych’s support was largely concentrated. The
striking turn of events showed the continued struggle of Ukraine to move out of Russia’s
sphere of influence and integrate into Europe.
Graphical data
It is important to observe, through visual graphs and data, how democracy has
developed in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine - and how its quality coincides with certain
economic and living conditions. The Polity Score project, which measures various
aspects of regime status and levels of executive authority, depicts a clear difference in
Polish and Ukrainian authority trends post-transition
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm):
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Figure 1

Figure 2
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As Figures 1 and 2 both show, Poland had a remarkable jump right after its transition,
while the fluctuating Ukrainian graph indicates the continued instability of its economy
and government.
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a widely respected database that
compiles a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and financial status in order
to measure a person’s progress in quality of life over time (“Human Development
Reports”):
Figure 3
Human Development Index (HDI) changes over time: Poland, Latvia, Ukraine
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Figure 3 shows that Poland’s HDI levels have historically increased with the
consolidation of democratic institutions, while Ukraine’s levels have ebbed and flowed in
conjunction with economic crises.
GDP per capita, measured in Figure 4, is a commonly used metric that is also
taken from the Human Development Index. It measures income levels and closely
mirrors HDI levels in each country (“Human Development Reports”):
Figure 4
GDP per capita (2011 PPP $): Poland, Latvia, Ukraine

It should be noted that, although not displayed graphically, data trends compiled from the
Gini coefficient also closely resemble that from HDI levels and GDP per capita. The Gini
coefficient is another economic metric that evaluates inequality levels. Levels of
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inequality directly and unsurprisingly coincided with the progression of democracy in
Poland and Latvia, and, just like HDI and GDP per capita, they have floundered in
Ukraine. Another noteworthy observation from both Figures 3 and 4 is the downturn in
Ukraine’s numbers (consistent in both graphs) around the year 2014, the time of the
Russian invasion. This data shows how Russian expansion directly impacted Ukraine’s
economy and living standards.
The final graph, Figure 5, shows data collected from the Freedom House Index,
which conducts research to measure levels of political freedoms and human rights around
the world. Figure 5 reveals the quality of civil liberties in each of the three countries over
the past two decades (“Freedom in the world”).
Figure 5
Freedom House Index Civil Liberties Grades Over Time: Poland,
Latvia, and Ukraine
1999

2010

2017

1

2

3

4
Civil Liberties grade
Poland

Civil Liberties grade
Latvia

33

Civil Liberties grade
Ukraine

Swafford 34
It is not a surprise that certain freedoms have suffered in Ukraine as its political system
has floundered in corruption. Freedom of the press, which is another category measured
by Freedom House over time, has tumbled ten points during the last decade in Ukraine
(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/ukraine). The underperformance of
Ukraine in civil liberties demonstrates the accuracy of Wolfgang Merkel’s concept of
“embedded democracy” and “partial regimes” in that the protection of civil liberties are a
necessity for a stable, functioning, and quality democracy.
Foreign actors
While causes like civil society, multiculturalism, and economic conditions were
integral in the democratic transitions during the “third wave” in Eastern Europe, the
impact of foreign actors cannot be underestimated. As Huntington wrote, “By the late
1980’s, the major sources of power and influence in the world – the Vatican, the
European Community, the U.S., and the Soviet Union – were all actively promoting
liberalization and democratization” (Huntington, 86). It is Huntington’s fifth “causative
factor” that is often overlooked, yet was incredibly important, to igniting democratization
in the late twentieth century. The biggest cause of any was undoubtedly the fall of the
Soviet Union and declining legitimacy of communism and authoritarianism in the Eastern
Bloc. The reforms of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980’s were the single
largest contributor to this consequential, historic decline of a world superpower.
Moreover, the ensuing democratic transitions of 15 states in the Soviet Bloc were a direct
result of changes in Soviet foreign policy initiated by Gorbachev’s government
(Huntington, 98-99).
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Upon ascending to the presidency, Mikhail Gorbachev revoked the Brezhnev
Doctrine – a hallmark of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War (Huntington, 99).
Devised by former General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, this doctrine was grounded in the
reality that the Soviet Union would intervene whenever necessary to maintain existing
communist dictatorships, especially within its sphere of influence. This was the
foundational idea, or the unwritten rule, upon which brutal military interventions were
enacted in the Cold War. Instead of doubling down on regional domination and military
threats, Gorbachev reversed course and pursued an agenda of economic liberalization,
political restructuring (perestroika), and openness to the West (glastnost). These famous
reforms angered many hardline factions within the Soviet communist party, but they were
necessary to save the country from economic calamity resulting from a military spending
bout with the U.S (Kissinger, 310-311). This total reversal of decades of Soviet foreign
policy doubtless gave way to all the other causes attributed to democratization in this
period.
Protests and disastrous economic conditions had been prevalent in Eastern Europe
for decades, but they were always suppressed or disguised by the hegemon in the region.
The Hungarian Uprising in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, as well as interventions in
Poland in the 70’s, are all examples of how the U.S.S.R. used its military might to
unilaterally protect dictatorships within its sphere of influence and impose rule and
ideology (Linz and Stepan, 237-238; Huntington, 118). Yet, Gorbachev worked directly
to de-legitimize and unseat old-guard authoritarian leaders in East Germany, Bulgaria,
and Czechoslovakia, and encouraged Communist Party leaders in Poland to join in a new
governing coalition led by Solidarity (Huntington, 99). By removing the threat of military
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force and embracing reforms like glastnost and perestroika, Moscow thus became not
just an enabler of, but a force for democracy. In Third Wave, Huntington boldly wrote
that Gorbachev joined John Paul II, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan as “the major
transnational promoters of democratic change” in the late twentieth century (Huntington,
100). Although it is not clear that Gorbachev had the same intentions as the other three
individuals cited, his actions directly resulted in full-scale democratization and the total
decline of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. In that vein, Huntington’s assertion
becomes sensible.
The role of the United States in this period cannot be underestimated either.
Although not as consequential as the Soviet Union, the U.S. definitely helped accelerate
democracy in Eastern Europe by changing its approach to foreign affairs. A few years
before Gorbachev came to power and initiated the Soviet reforms, the U.S. became an
active player in supporting democracy efforts around the world. With the end of the
Nixon and Ford administrations also came the conclusion of an era of Henry Kissinger’s
realpolitik foreign policy. Whereas Secretary Kissinger geared U.S. foreign relations to
focus vigorously on American interests and downplay the need to meddle in the domestic
affairs of other nations, President Carter vowed to put human rights on the “world
agenda” in his 1976 campaign (Huntington, 92). This promise came after certain
congressional initiatives amended foreign assistance treaties to make it possible for the
president to deny foreign aid to authoritarian regimes guilty of gross human rights
violations (Huntington, 91). Carter did indeed make human rights more of an emphasis
by the American government as he helped upgrade the American bureaucracy to give
human rights programs more organizational clout (Huntington, 92).
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When President Ronald Reagan came into office, he built on the Carter
administration’s focus on human rights, but in a different way. Whereas Carter focused
on specific humanitarian abuses, the Reagan administration sought to target the
governments that enabled abuses and oppression to occur (Huntington, 92). Therefore, in
the 1980’s, it was the ideological foe of communism and authoritarianism that drove the
Reagan foreign policy. In this period, the National Endowment for Democracy was
created, the U.S. applied economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures to oppressive
regimes, and also gave heavy financial and tactical support to pro-democracy forces
around the world (Huntington, 93-94). This included millions of dollars sent to support
Solidarity in Poland by the CIA (Huntington, 94). President Reagan and British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher, who were close allies and both fervently anti-communists,
engaged Gorbachev personally - forming an open dialogue manifested in many
conferences that precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union. One example was the
Reykjavik talks in 1986, in which Reagan proposed the elimination of all nuclear delivery
systems and boldly walked away after his Russian counterpart refused (Kissinger, 313).
President George H.W. Bush also used skilled personal diplomacy during his
term, which directly coincided with the democratic transitions in the Eastern Bloc.
President Bush resisted the urge to celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall or excessively
relish in America’s triumph in the Cold War – which simultaneously meant Soviet
embarrassment at the fall of their empire (Kissinger, 315; Meacham, 400-401). With this
measured diplomacy, his administration helped soften the blow of the end of the Cold
War to the dissolving Soviet Union. This made it safer for democracies in the Eastern
Bloc to re-create their sovereignty and normalize their national identity – evidenced by
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the reunification of Germany (Meacham, 400-402). In effect, Presidents Carter, Bush but especially Reagan - helped put democracy and human rights on the world’s
conscience, and at the epicenter of international affairs (Huntington, 94-95). No longer
were these “Western values” placed at the periphery of American foreign policy, but in
the 1980’s they became a central focus. This in turn sided the U.S. (along with the
Vatican) with resistance groups fighting communism’s oppressions, and emboldened
freedom fighters to generate change.
European institutions were likewise influential in supporting democracy
movements. Although not as impactful as the Soviet Union, the U.S., or the Vatican, the
European Community began what became known as the Helsinki Process (Huntington,
89-90). Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which have since morphed
into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), drafted documents
that offered support for Western values (Huntington, 89-90; Kissinger, 309). Conferences
in Belgrade, Vienna, and Madrid prompted communist governments to endorse Western
values, and thus opened them up to international criticism when they violated their treaty
commitments (Huntington, 90). This pressure and oversight conducted by the West was
largely symbolic, but it still aided the perception of democracy in Eastern Europe and
contributed to the falling legitimacy of the Soviet Union.
Summary and Conclusions
After careful examination of the numerous causes related to “third wave”
democratization, and after considering them in light of relevant theory, it is clear that the
most defining cause of democratic transition in this period was the impact of Soviet
reforms and the chain reaction they set in motion. The pivot of the U.S.S.R. toward the
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West and newfound support of economic openness and political restructuring, combined
with the removal of the Brezhnev doctrine, led to the collapse of Soviet regional
influence and the reputation of communism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism in
general. Moreover, this shift in foreign policy and evaporation of power directly gave
way to a revitalized civil society and emboldened dissent in the Eastern Bloc. This is how
groups like Solidarity and the “Baltic Way” gained their autonomy from the state and
effectively organized to voice their opposition to the existing governments in the region.
Combined with other causes like economic stagnation, these movements and domestic
forces in each satellite state eventually succeeded in bringing democratic change. It is in
this fusion of both Huntington’s hypothesis of the impact of foreign influence and Linz
and Stepan’s theory regarding civil society as a necessary pre-condition for democratic
consolidation that the overarching cause of democratization in this era is found.
Having validated the central impact of Soviet reforms, it is still important not to
lose sight of the roles that the Vatican, the U.S., and, to a lesser degree, the European
Community occupied in this process. Through foundational shifts in both America’s and
the Vatican’s approach to foreign affairs, democratization in East-Central Europe was
undoubtedly hastened. America’s power and the influence of President Reagan and Pope
John Paul II must not be downplayed when observing this era. By embracing their roles
as world leaders and championing democracy and human rights, the rise of American and
Catholic influence collided at just the right time to bring about the ideological defeat of
communism.
Barriers to consolidation still exist in Poland, Latvia, Ukraine, and many other
democracies in Europe. The “pacted transition” in Poland, or the “curse of the first,”
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which left the country with reserved domains of power, understandably complicated the
Polish transition for a time (Linz and Stepan, 264). In Latvia, exclusive policies adopted
by the government post-independence damaged relations with a significant minority
population (Linz and Stepan, 414-420). Going forward, the Latvian state must reconcile
the idea of a “nation-state” with a multicultural, liberal democracy. In Ukraine - which
still struggles with democratic consolidation – corruption, economic crisis, and
dependence on Russia continue to stand between a kleptocratic state and a healthy
democracy with full protection of civil liberties. Economic growth and political
sovereignty will not occur until the Ukrainian state fully claims independence from its
hegemonic neighbor.
Implications
Examining the implications of certain present-day geopolitical realities, in light of
this historical study, is imperative to imagine the future of democratic stability in Eastern
Europe. Today, Russia is no longer receding from the world stage, or withdrawing its
influence and power. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia continues to attempt to re-create that
Soviet-style sphere of influence and has conducted a worldwide assault on democracy
and human rights. This is evident by the unilateral invasion into Ukraine in 2014,
continued tactical support for separatist militias in Eastern Ukraine, crimes committed in
the Syrian civil war and complicit support of a war criminal in Bashar al-Assad, and the
meddling in U.S. and European elections. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a landgrab and a violation of international law the likes of which Europe had not witnessed
since Hitler’s expansion in the 1930’s. Putin appears to define Russian foreign policy
success as anything that comes at the expense of democracy, the U.S., or Western
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unification. All of this begs the question: how safe are democracies like Latvia and
Ukraine today, and what will the West do about this resurgent Russian aggression?
Possible Russian expansion into the Baltic region is no notion of fantasy. In 1995,
Boris Yeltsin’s foreign minister remarked at the UN that the use of Russian force in
Estonia or Latvia would be justified to defend the rights of the Russian minority in the
two Baltic nations (“Meri Dismayed”). Today, Russia is clearly more aggressive and
likely to expand under Putin. When annexing Crimea, one of the reasons that Putin cited
at the time was the need to bring ethnic Russians back into the “motherland,” which was
essentially the same reason Hitler gave for annexing Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other
territories in the 1930’s (Conant). According to the CIA World Factbook, the percentage
of Russian minorities in Ukraine in 2014, at the time of invasion, was 17.3 percent
(Conant). Today, Latvia has the highest percentage of ethnic Russians of any European
country, at 26.2 percent (Conant). This is only another incentive for the Latvian
government to adopt inclusive policies towards its Russian minority – not only for their
democracy, but for their security and stability.
In these uncertain times of tension, strong American moral leadership need not be
in question. This is because, as it was in the 1980’s, American engagement is once again
critical to restraining Russia and supporting democracies in Eastern Europe and around
the world. American commitment to NATO, the continued stability of the EU, and
Western support of democracy and human rights will arguably help determine the fate of
certain vulnerable nations in Eastern Europe. In the 2016 campaign, then-candidate
Donald Trump, when asked about what he would do as president if a NATO ally in the
Baltic region was attacked by Russia, was noncommittal on his support of collective
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defense – obligatory under Article V of the NATO treaty (Fisher). President Trump’s
concerns over defense spending with underpaying NATO allies are justified, and
certainly not new. Even still, America must be committed to the military alliance. As this
study revealed, the stability of democracies in Eastern Europe and the success of prodemocracy dissent movements at least partly depend on American support, even if it is
largely rhetorical. In a new era of Russian aggression, this support is as important as ever.
If American allies in the region are to feel safe from this real threat, the U.S., along with
the liberal West, must once again establish itself as that “shining city on a hill” – a
beacon of freedom for all to see.
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